If my ability to react freely is constrained by forces beyond my control, am I still morally responsible for the things I do? The question of whether, how and to what extent we are responsible for our own actions has always been central to debates in philosophy and theology, and has been the subject of much recent research in cognitive science. And for good reason- the views we take on free will affect the choices we make as individuals, the moral judgments we make of others, and they will inform public policy. Michael McKenna's text introduces this important subject with remarkable clarity, offering the first comprehensive overview of both incompatibilist and compatibilist stances. He begins by motivating both viewpoints, then provides classical accounts of each before giving students an in-depth examination of current scholarship in the free will debate.
Topics covered include: * the nature of free will * the nature of determinism * the nature of moral responsibility * arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism * arguments of the compatibility of free will and determinism * libertarian theories of free will and moral responsibility * compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility * hard determinist and hard incompatibilist theories