This dissertation argues that ordinary language analysis offers a means

of critically evaluating substantive philosophical claims as well as providing a tool

for constructing answers to philosophical conundrums. It has been neglected due to

some powerful, though ultimately misguided, objections. Those who called

themselves ordinary language philosophers did not effectively explain or

defend their methodology and thus these objections were never adequately met. This dissertation

articulates and defends the methodology and its core theoretical commitments.

Ordinary language philosophy is essentially an empirical investigation into

how words are used in ordinary (non-philosophical) contexts. Some believed that we

could eliminate philosophical conundrums via such analysis. Wittgenstein, for

example, thought that most philosophical problems were caused by linguistic

confusion. I argue that the methodology does have an important critical role to play,

but I also believe that it can be an important tool in constructing genuine solutions to

problems.