Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics

When accounting for phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes the claim that `the principle does not immediately appear to the man who has been corrupted by pleasure or pain.' While contemporary commentators on the Ethics have virtually nothing to say about this, Aristotle's medieval interpreters in the Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin traditions made substantial contributions towards a clarification of the claim's meaning and relevance. Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics investigates both Aristotle's claim itself and its reception in various medieval Aristotelian traditions.

Even when the hazards of transmission have left no explicit comments on this particular passage, as is the case in the Arabic tradition, Aristotle's commentators still offer valuable interpretations of phantasia (representation) and its role in deliberation and action. This volume casts light on these readings, showing how the distant voices from the medieval Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin Aristotelian traditions still contribute substantially to contemporary debate concerning phantasia, motivation and deliberation in Aristotle's Ethics.