The concept of rationality has often been discussed within the restrictive

bounds of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, reason and tradition.

In this thesis, I have sought to question this sharp distinction between reason

and tradition. On the strength of my study in the work, I am led to think that the

questions of theoretical rationality as in mathematics and the sciences, as well as

of practical rationality as in the value disciplines or in choosing one from

amongst different competing theories and traditions, cannot be asked nor

answered in isolation from their relevant traditions of inquiry (the epistemic

enterprise), that rationality essentially is tradition embedded. Given the plurality

of diverse traditions, problems of relativism and incommensurability arise. I

endeavour to address these problems in the light of the brute fact of actual

contact, interaction, understanding and communication between different

traditions. I show that the incommensurability thesis does not necessarily lead to

relativism and that the view of tradition embedded rationality which is

maintained in this work need not be characterized as relativistic. In the course

of my argument, I have considered different ways of examining the issue of

conflict resolution between rival traditions in terms of growth and development

of inquiry with a view to transcending the narrow limitations of particular

viewpoints.